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Abstract 
Aim: This study aims to investigate the sensitivity level of liquidity and leverage to investment decision between non-
financially and financially constrained firms at low and high investment firm. Materials and Methods: The sample 
includes sharia firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2011 to 2015 and 96 firms are selected as sample 
with 480 observations for data collection. Results: The results reveal that liquidity and leverage have a positive influence to 
investment decision of all sampled firms, and also firms with low and high investment value. Liquidity is more sensitive to 
investment decision for financially constrained firms and for firms with low investment value. Leverage is more sensitive to 
investment decision for non-financially constrained firms with high investment value. Conclusion: This study concludes that 
there is a close interdependency between investment decision and financing decision.  
Keywords: Interdependency, investment decision, liquidity, leverage, financially constrained, non-financially constrained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
* Corresponding author: Business and Economics Faculty, Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia 
Hidayat et al.                                                                                                                         Transylvanian Review: Vol XXVI, No. 25, February  2018 
6670 
Introduction 
The purpose of the firm is to increase the value of the 
firm. Firm value could be achieved if the firm invests. 
Investment is an important factor in the firm's financial 
function. Kim (2018) stated that firm value is solely 
determined by investment decisions. The opinion could be 
interpreted that the investment decision is very important, 
because to achieve the firm's goal is to maximize 
shareholder wealth will only be generated through firm 
investment activities. Investment decision in this research 
is capital expenditure. It is the investment in fixed assets 
such as land or property, building, and equipment. 
According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2013), capital 
budgeting is the overall planning and decision-making 
process of spending on funds with a refund period 
exceeding one year. The basic motive for capital 
expenditure is for the expansion, replacement, or renewal 
of fixed assets or for benefits that may be less tangible in 
the long-term. Shibata and Nishihara (2018) stated that 
under perfect market conditions there is no relationship 
between investment decisions and financing decisions. 
According to Brigham and Houston (2012), despite the 
perfect market assumption eliminated, separation of 
investment and financing decisions still occur despite 
slight modifications that is managers should use the 
weighted average capital cost as a discount rate. Even 
when capital structure has become relevant, whether due 
to tax factors or due to other factors, there is still no direct 
relationship between investment and financing. The 
existing is that the investment program is decided first and 
then decided to financing. In order for investment 
decisions are really aimed at maximizing firm value, so 
investment decisions should be independent of financing 
decisions. Financing decisions can be an indicator by the 
market to predict future prospects. Firms with good 
prospects will address the need for funds by borrowing 
any investment opportunity. However, if the prospect of a 
firm is unfavorable it will make the need for funds 
continuously, so the firm will overcome the problem of 
financing needs with new investment opportunity. The 
financing source of the firm can basically come from 
internal and external sources. Funds collected from 
accumulation of unearned profit shares are said to be 
internal funds. Of course, with the development of the firm, 
internal funds are insufficient, so that funds from external 
sources are required. Funds originating from external 
sources can be in the form of debt to other parties or in the 
form of capital collected from the owner (through the 
issuance of stock to the public or private placement). 
Modigliani and Miller’s statement is different from the 
results of empirical research. Empirical research indicates 
a linkage between investment decisions and financing 
decisions, in this case there is a link between the level of 
liquidity and the level of investment in many firms. The 
empirical evidence of Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and Yang 
(2016), Quader (2016) indicate that there is a relationship 
between liquidity and debt with investment decisions. The 
results of empirical research in Indonesia are shown by 
Agung (2000) and Prasetyantoko (2007). Similar research 
findings are also recommended by Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1991) in Japan. From the above empirical 
findings, it shows that there is a distinction between the 
theory that investment decisions and financing decisions 
are independent of the practices of firms. In addition, the 
results of the research indicate a discrepancy in the 
findings of the sensitivity of firm investment decisions with 
liquidity when moderated by financial constraints. 
Bayraktar (2014), Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), 
Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and Yang (2016), Quader (2016), 
George, Kabir, and Qian (2011) and Kim (2014) found 
evidence that firm investment decisions are more sensitive 
to liquidity in financially constrained firms hereafter 
abbreviated FC, compared to non-financially constrained 
firms hereinafter abbreviated as NFC. In contrast, Bassetto 
and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012) and Cull, Li, 
Sunc, and Xu (2014) found that firm investment decisions 
are more sensitive to liquidity in NFC firms than FC firms. 
Similarly, the results of debt sensitivity research on 
investment decisions of FC and NFC firms show different 
findings. The results of Ameer (2014), Guariglia and Yang 
(2016) that investment decisions are more sensitive to debt 
to FC firms than NFC firms. In contrast, Ogawa (2015) 
found that the firm's investment decision was more 
sensitive to debts to NFC firms. Research of Agung (2000) 
shows that the investment of NFC and FC firms differs in 
response to debt levels. Investments issued by FC firms 
respond negatively to debt levels, whereas NFC firms have 
no effect on investment. Given the contrast of empirical 
evidence above, this study will further examine the factors 
that distinguish the two opposing evidence, namely by 
using the FC and NFC variables as moderators. Financial 
constraints are the limitations of the firms in obtaining 
capital from available financing sources to invest. 
According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997), financial 
constraints occur when firms face a difference between 
the cost of capital from internal financing sources and the 
cost of capital from external financing sources. Based on 
the above description and the results of empirical 
research, this research aims at examining the level of 
influence of liquidity and debt to the investment decisions 
of the firm both the firm as a whole in the sample and firm 
with low and high investment in FC and NFC firm. FC firms 
refer firms that have financial constraints in making 
investments, while NFC firms refer to firms that have no 
financial constraints in investing. FC firms tend to use 
liquidity to fund investments. This is because FC firms 
have limited access to capital markets and are relatively 
smaller, showing financial constraints that will make it 
difficult for firms to take advantage of investment 
opportunity for investment. In other words, FC firms have 
low firm value. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) 
noted that the existence of information asymmetry on 
external financing would incur external financing costs 
more than internal financing, which resulted in less FC 
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firms having access to external financing. With these 
limitations, the investment decisions of FC firms tend to be 
more sensitive to liquidity. Based on the difference of 
research result, this research intends to reconcile the level 
of influence of liquidity and debt to investment decision by 
entering variable of FC and NFC as moderator in firm as a 
whole and firm having low and high investment. In 
addition, this study also uses the classification of financial 
constrains firms that are different from the previous 
research. Fazzari et al. (1988) classified financial 
constrains into three categories, that is dividend payout 
ratio of low (<10%) or grade 1 to high (20%) or class 3. 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classified samples into five 
groups from financial low to high constrains with an 
objective multivariate classification approach. Bassetto 
and Kalatzis (2011) measured financial constrains using 
dummy variables of financial indicators, namely cash 
holding (high and low), profitability (high and low), cash 
flow (high and low), debt (high and low), and sales (high 
and low). Bayraktar (2014)measures financial constrains 
using dummy variables, namely size of capital stock (high 
and low), number of laborers (few and many), dividend 
payout ratios (high and low), dividend to capital ratios 
(high and low), bond rating (no bond rating and bond 
rating), total debt to capital ratio (high and low), KZ Index. 
This study classified NFC and FC firms using four stages, 
namely dividend policy, cash flow, debt, and investment 
opportunity. 
Literature Review 
In theory, investment decisions are separated from 
financing decisions. This is in line with the statement of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) that under perfect market 
conditions there is no relationship between investment 
decisions and financing decisions. However, the results of 
empirical research indicate that investment decision is 
influenced by financing decision, which includes liquidity 
and debt and its sensitivity to financial constrains firm. 
Financial constraints are the limitations of firm in 
obtaining capital from available financing sources to 
invest. According to Kaplan and Zingales (2000), financial 
constraints occur when firms face a difference between 
the cost of capital from internal financing sources and the 
cost of capital from external financing sources. By that 
definition all firms can be classified as financial 
constraints. Having external financing that incurs a small 
transaction fee is suitable to put the firm in the category of 
financial constraints. The definition is also useful to 
distinguish the firm according to the financial constraints 
category. Fazzari et al. (1988) state that financial 
constraints show the sensitivity of investment and liquidity 
caused by information asymmetry in the capital market 
resulting in external financing such as debt is more 
expensive than internal financing so it is not risky for 
managers to use internal financing sources to invest. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), information 
asymmetry occurs because managers are more aware of 
the firm's current earnings and investment opportunity 
compared to outside investors. The manager also acts in 
accordance with the interests of the firm's existing 
shareholders. Financial constraints are also caused by 
agency problems. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), managers prefer to use internal capital to finance 
investment because internal capital can reduce the 
involvement of oversight from shareholders or external 
part that is to investment decisions made by managers. 
Owners control management to keep the utilization of 
internal capital for investment in line with the interests of 
the owner. Investment decisions made by the firm are 
influenced by the ability of the firm to generate cash that 
can meet long-term or short-term needs or the so-called 
liquidity of the firm. Liquidity is the firm's ability to fulfill 
its liabilities, especially short-term liabilities (Brigham & 
Ehrhardt, 2013). According to Brigham and Houston (2012), 
a liquid firm is a firm that has such great strength that it is 
able to fulfill all its financial liabilities that must be met 
immediately, the ability to pay is related to the 
implementation of the production process. Liquidity is the 
firm's ability to generate cash to meet both long-term and 
short-term firm needs (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). The 
definition explicitly indicates whether with the available 
cash the firm has difficulty to fund its investment or not. 
The firm is said to have no difficulty in financing its 
investment if the firm is able to generate cash in financing 
the investment. In this research, liquidity is proxies by 
cash flow. Cash flow consists of cash inflows and outflow 
cash flow. Outflow cash is usually used to make new 
investments, while cash inflows are the result of the 
investment. According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2013), the 
cash flow statement is a report explaining the impact of 
the firm's operating, investing and financing activities on 
cash flows during one accounting period. The cash flows of 
firms with high volatility levels have expenditures, 
research and development costs, as well as lower 
advertising costs (Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 1997). This 
means that different levels of investment will create 
different volatility, depending on the firm's investment 
objectives. Usually firms do not use debt or equity markets 
so that cash flow volatility is not sharp, because the cost of 
entry into the capital market is also associated with the 
volatility of firm cash flow. Research of Črnigoj and Verbič 
(2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and Yang (2016), Quader 
(2016), George et al. (2011), and Kim (2014) shows that 
there is a link between liquidity with investment decisions. 
Empirical evidence in Indonesia is shown by Agung (2000) 
who found that liquidity is positively associated with 
investment decisions. Based on the description, the 
hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
 
H1: Liquidity has a positive effect on investment decisions 
both in the firm as a whole and in the firms with low and 
high investment.  
 
One of the mechanisms that can be used to increase firm 
value is by increasing the proportion of debt. According to 
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agency theory, one of the bonding mechanisms to limit 
manager opportunist behavior is to increase debt. Adding 
debt can reduce agency costs that can increase firm value 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The thing that needs to get the 
firm's management attention in carrying out its duty to 
maximize the value of the firm is the capital structure, 
which is a combination of debt and equity used to finance 
the firm's long-term investment. It is very important to be 
noticed by the management firm because: 1) the 
composition between debt and equity will affect the 
average cost of capital, 2) the increase in debt will increase 
the risk because the firm must bear the fixed costs 
(interest) to be paid even though the firm is experiencing a 
loss. Capital structure is defined as the long-term capital 
structure (both from internal and external sources) 
available to finance the firm's activities. According to 
Brigham and Houston (2012), long-term capital, meaning 
capital that can be used by firm for more than one year. 
Therefore, the firm's capital structure can be described by 
the ratio of debt to equity as well as total assets. Thus, 
when the firm needs funds to make investments in capital 
expenditure, the firm also needs resources, and one of 
them is from debt. Modigliani and Miller (1959) suggest 
that as far as interest payments can be used to reduce the 
tax burden, debt reduction will benefit the owner of the 
firm. However, such benefits will be recognized by the cost 
of bankruptcy and possible personal tax differences 
between income from equity and from debt. Theoretically 
the firm should use the debt that will minimize the cost of 
the firm's capital. Debt provides benefits and expenses 
simultaneously. Debt benefits are obtained in the form of 
relatively low capital costs due to tax savings (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1959). Expenses incurred due to indebtedness 
create the cost of bankruptcy as a result of a fixed expense 
to be borne. Therefore, the firms need to find the optimal 
composition between debt and equity, which brings 
benefits to the cost for investment that the firm can do to 
succeed and provide benefits for the firm in the future. 
Research results of Ameer (2014) and Guariglia and Yang 
(2016) show that debt has a positive effect on investment 
decisions. Based on the above description, the hypothesis 
proposed in this study is the debt has a positive effect on 
investment decisions both on the firm as a whole and in 
the firm with low and high investment. Managers prefer to 
use internal capital to finance investments because 
internal capital can reduce the involvement of oversight 
from shareholders or external parties to investment 
decisions made by manager’s manager (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). According to Fazzari et al. (1988) that FC 
firms tend to be more sensitive to internal financing 
(liquidity) in making investments. This tendency is due to 
the information asymmetry of external financing, so that 
external financing (debt) is more expensive than internal 
financing resulting in less FC firm having access to 
external financing sources. Result research of Carpenter 
and Guariglia (2008), Chen, Cao, Zhang, and Dickinson 
(2013), Bayraktar (2014), Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič 
(2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and Yang (2016), Quader 
(2016), George et al. (2011), and Kim (2014) shows that 
investment decision of FC firm is more sensitive to 
liquidity than NFC firm. In contrast, research by Bassetto 
and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012), and Cull et al. 
(2014) shows that investment from NFC firms is more 
sensitive to liquidity than investment from FC firms. Based 
on the description, the hypothesis proposed in this 
research is: 
 
H2: Liquidity is more influential on investment decisions 
in FC firm than NFC firm both in the firm as a whole and in 
firm with low and high investment. 
 
The firms with good prospects will address the need for 
funds by borrowing for investment opportunity. However, if 
the prospect of a firm is unfavorable it will make the need 
for funds continuously, so the firm will overcome the 
problem of financing needs with new investment 
opportunity. Issuance of new equity causes the firm's value 
reflected in the loosing stock price. Information 
asymmetry will in addition hamper the firm's ability to 
raise funds through the issuance of new shares, will also 
create an imperfect demand elasticity of equity funds by 
limiting access to retain earning (Myers, 1984). 
Transaction costs are generally smaller than debt to equity 
to reduce the various costs arising from the choice 
between debt and equity. Brigham and Houston (2012) 
argue that the use of interest-bearing debt has advantages 
and disadvantages for the firm. The advantages of using 
debt are: The interest cost reduces the taxable income, so 
the cost of effective debt becomes lower, and Debt holder 
has no voting rights so the owner can control the firm with 
less funds. While the loss of debt usage is if the firm's 
business is not in good condition, the operating income 
becomes low and not enough to cover the interest expense 
so that the owner's property is reduced. Guariglia and 
Yang (2016) suggest that firms with FC are less able to 
invest more when there is a good opportunity by using 
internal cash or external funds. Firm investments are not 
only related to cash operations but also related to external 
sources such as debt. The firms with high debt typically 
allocate their debts for investment, if the higher the debt 
the more assets the firm has. Mayer (1990) found: there is 
ownership of the dominant financial resources in all firm, 
the average firm of most that firm does not take into 
account the financial substance arising from the capital 
market in the form of share, bonds, or short-term equity, 
and the majority of external financing comes from bank 
debt in all country. In their research, Ameer (2014), and 
Guariglia and Yang (2016) found that investment decisions 
are more sensitive to debt on FC firms than NFC firms. 
Instead Ogawa (2015) found that firm investment decisions 
are more sensitive to debt to NFC firms than FC firms. 
Research of Agung (2000) show that the investment of NFC 
and FC firms differs in response to debt levels. 
Investments issued by FC firm respond negatively to debt 
levels, whereas NFC firm have no effect on investment. 
Hence the hypothesis in this study is: 
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H3: The debt is more influential on investment decisions 
in NFC firm than FC firm either overall or in firm with low 
and high investment. 
Materials and Methods 
The population in this study is public firm listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange, with samples of sharia 
firms. Data required in this study is the firm's financial 
statements from 2011 to 2015. Data obtained from IDX and 
ICMD (Indonesia Capital Market Directory). The criteria of 
sampling method are only to include sharia firms listed on 
the BEI and publish its financial statements from 2011 to 
2015 consistently. The independent variables in this 
research are liquidity which is proxy by cash flow and debt 
which is proxy with debt to assets ratio (DAR). Cash flow is 
measured by net income plus depreciation and/or 
amortization divided by fixed assets. DAR is measured by 
total debt divided by total assets. Dependent variable in 
this research is investment. Investment in this research is 
net capital expenditure and calculated during period t. 
Investments are measured by fixed assets t minus fixed 
assets t-1 divided by fixed assets. Fixed assets refer to 
land, buildings and equipment. Cash flow and investment 
are divided by fixed assets to control the effects of the 
firm's scale differences. The moderating variables in this 
study are financial constraints classify into two, that is 
non-financially constrained (NFC) and financially 
constrained (FC). In this research to classify NFC and FC 
firm using four stages by looking at dividend policy, cash 
flow, leverage, and investment opportunity. The initial 
classification is built on dividend policy. Several research 
use dividend payout ratios (Almeida, Campello, & 
Weisbach, 2011, Baños Caballero, García Teruel, & 
Martínez Solano, 2014, Bayraktar, 2014, Fazzari et al., 
1988, Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). The firms that do not 
dividends are in FC category, while firm that pay dividends 
are NFC category. Fazzari et al. (1988) suggest that there 
are two possible explanations for why firms pay low 
dividends. First, firms face the cost of expensive external 
financing sources because of the information asymmetry 
that uses most of the profits to finance their investments 
rather than paying high dividends. Second, the company 
does not earn enough profit to pay dividends. The firms 
paying dividends are included in the NFC category, while 
the firms that do not pay dividends are included in the FC 
category. The firms included in the FC category may not be 
able to pay dividends for not being able to pay, but the 
possibility of funds owned is used for other purposes such 
as for investment, it is necessary to do the second 
classification by looking at cash flow. In the second 
classification as used by Rousseau and Kim (2008), 
Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012) firms 
with larger cash flows than the average cash flow of all 
samples are categorized as NFC firm, which has a cash 
flow smaller than the average cash flow of all samples 
categorized as FC. The firms with large cash flows tend not 
to experience constraints in financing and conversely firm 
with small cash flows tend to experience constraints in 
financing. The third classification is looking at investment 
opportunity of the firm. The firm's investment opportunity 
in this case is proxy by market to book ratio as used by 
Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009) and Hovakimian and 
Titman (2003) in classifying NFC and FC firms. The firms 
are in the NFC category if the market to book ratio is 
higher than the average book to market ratio of all samples 
and the firm is in the FC category if the market to book 
ratio is lower than the average book to market ratio of all 
samples. The firms that have a high to market to book ratio 
mean the firm has a market value that is higher than its 
book value that reflects the NFC firm. Thus the NFC firm 
will easily obtain external sources of financing because it 
has a high value of the value of the book, so investors will 
be interested to buy the stock of the firm. Furthermore, to 
obtain more accurate results in classifying NFC and FC 
firms, the financially constrained firms in the third 
classification are followed by the fourth classification as 
done by Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Bayraktar (2014) by 
looking at firm debt. The firms that have high debt levels 
tend to be difficult to access external financing sources 
and conversely firms with low debt levels tend to find it 
easy to access external financing sources. Therefore, in 
this study the firms that have debt ratio than the average 
ratio of debt would become the samples of the study, and 
they are categorized as NFC firm, while the firm that has 
debt ratio is higher than the average ratio of debt of all 
samples then categorized as FC firm. Of the four stages of 
the classification, then for more clearly can be seen in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Classification of the firm financially constrained and non-financially constrained 
 
In this case, Div. is dividend, CF is cash flow, MB is the 
ratio of market to book proxy of investment opportunity, 
Debt is debt, NFC is non-financially constrained, and FC is 
financially constrained. So firm are categorized as NFC 
Div 
 Pay = NFC 
 Un-pay 
 High = NFC 
 Low 
CF 
 High = NFC 
 Low 
MB 
 Low = NFC 
 High = FC 
Debt 
Hidayat et al.                                                                                                                         Transylvanian Review: Vol XXVI, No. 25, February  2018 
6674 
firms when they pay dividends, have high cash flow, high 
market to book, and low debt. While the firm is categorized 
as FC firms if the firm does not pay dividends, has a low 
cash flow, low market to book, and high debt. The control 
variables in this study are investment opportunity proxy 
by market to book (MB) and firm SIZE measured by Ln 
total assets. The test model in this study used three 
moderation regression equations as follows: 
 
INVATit = β0 + β1CFATit + β2DARit + β3Dit + β4 CFit*Dit + β5 
DARit*Dit + MBit β6 + SIZEit β6 + uit            (1) 
INVLOWit = β0 + β1CFATit + β2DARit + β3Dit + β4 CFit*Dit + 
β5 DARit*Dit + MBit β6 + SIZEit β6 + uit            (2) 
INVHIGHit = β0 + β1CFATit + β2DARit + β3Dit + β4 CFit*Dit + 
β5 DARit*Dit + MBit β6 + SIZEit β6 + uit            (3) 
 
In this case, INVAT is an investment in capital 
expenditures divided by fixed assets in the firm as a whole 
(total sample), INVLOW is an investment in a firm with low 
investment that has an investment value below the average 
value of the sample, INVHIGH is an investment in a firm 
with high investment that has an investment value above 
the average value of the sample, as a dependent variable, 
CFAT is a cash flow divided by fixed assets which is a 
proxy for liquidity and DAR (debt to assets ratio) as an 
independent variable, D is the dummy variable of FC and 
NFC firms, 1 is FC and 0 is an NFC firm, CF*D is the 
interaction between CF and dummy variables and DAR*D 
is the interaction between DAR and dummy variables, as 
moderating variables, and MB (market to book) are the 
proxy of investment opportunity and SIZE is the size of the 
firm as a control variable. Cash flows and investments are 
divided by fixed assets to control the effect of firm scale 
differences. 
Results and Discussion 
Based on the sample selection criteria of sharia firms 
listed on the BEI and publish their financial statements 
from 2011 to 2015 consistently, it is obtained a sample of 
165 sharia firms for five years with the number of 
observations of 825. From 165 firms, there are 69 firms 
whose data outliers because have a value of cash flow, 
market to book, debt to assets and investments is negative, 
so it is excluded from the sample. So the final sample of 
this study amounted to 96 sharia firms for five years with a 
number of 480 observations. The descriptive statistics of 
variables in this study can be seen in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics among variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
INVAT 0,110 0,249 0,1647 0,0294 
CFAT 0,140 3,456 1,6401 0,6641 
DAR 0,060 1,800 0,7014 0,3797 
MB 0,950 2,629 1,6253 0,3206 
SIZE 7,774 18,132 12,7728 0,8772 
N                  480 
Note: INVAT (investment divided by fixed assets) as the dependent variable, CFAT (cash flow divided by fixed assets) and DAR 
(total debt divided by total assets) as independent variable, MB (equity market value divided by book value of equity) and SIZE 
(Ln total assets) as control variable 
 
Moderate variables in this study used dummy, 1 for FC 
firms and 0 for NFC firms. Firm classification is 
categorized as FC and NFC seen from dividend, cash flow, 
market to book, and debt. The firms categorized as FC firm 
if the firm does not pay dividends, have cash flow and 
market to book that are lower than the sample average, 
and have debt higher than the sample average. While the 
firms are categorized as NFC firm when firm pay 
dividends, have cash flow and market to book higher than 
the average sample, and have debt lower than the average 
sample. The results of the classification of firm 
categorized as FC and NFC can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Result of classification of the firm financially constrained and non-financially constrained 
 
Figure 2 shows that the initial classification is seen from 
the dividend, an observer firm paying a dividend of 275 and 
not paying a dividend of 305. In the second classification, 
firms are observed not paying any dividends any more 
cash flow, at this stage indicating that has a cash flow 
higher than the average sample increased 48 to 223 and 
which is smaller than the average sample decreased 48 to 
257 observations. In the third classification, the observed 
firm that are still low cash flow is seen again market to 
book it, the classification results show the number of firm 
Pay  
High  D 
Un-pay  CF High  
Low 
(275) 
(175+48=223) 
Low  (305) MB (223+59=282) 
Low 
High  
(305-48=257) 
(257-59=198) 
Debt 
(282+64=346) 
(198-64=134) 
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that have market to book higher than the average sample 
increased 59 to 282 observations, while firm that have 
market to book lower than the sample mean reduced by 59 
to 198 observations. In the last classification of the firm 
that still high market to book it is seen again its debt, the 
classification results indicate that firm that have debt 
lower than the average sample increased 64 to 346 and 
observed firm have debt above the average sample is 
reduced 64 to 134 observations. Thus, firms categorized as 
FC were observed 134 times, while firms categorized as 
NFC got 346 observations. The descriptive statistics of 
research variables in the firm FC and NFC can be seen in 
the following Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of FC and NFC firms 
Variable 
FC NFC 
Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
Dividend Pay Un-pay 
CFAT 0,140 2,709 1,463 0,535 0,144 3,456 1,708 0,696 
DAR 0,060 1,424 0,599 0,306 0,110 1,800 0,741 0,397 
MB 1,012 2,548 1,543 0,283 0,950 2,629 1,657 0,329 
SIZE 9,554 16,485 12,772 1,393 7,774 18,132 12,773 2,035 
INVAT 0,120 0,230 0,161 0,029 0,110 0,249 0,165 0,029 
N 134 346 
Note: Dividend (pay and un-pay), CFAT (cash flow divided by fixed assets), DAR (total debt divided by total assets) in percent, 
MB (equity market value divided by book value of equity) in time, is a classification of FC and NFC, whereas SIZE (Ln total 
assets) as control variable and INVAT (investment divided by fixed assets) are dependent variable and not classification of FC 
and NFC 
 
In this study, testing was conducted to the entire 
investment of the sampled firms with low and high 
investment. The firms include into the high investment 
category if the value of investment is higher than the 
average sample (0,215) and into the category of firm with 
low investment if the investment value is lower than the 
average value of the sample. Descriptive statistics of the 
firms with low and high investment can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of low and high firm investment  
Variable 
Low Investment High Investment 
Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
INVAT 0,110 0,210 0,157 0,021 0,216 0,249 0,226 0,009 
CFAT 0,142 3,456 1,670 0,613 0,329 2,651 1,568 0,578 
DAR 0,060 1,790 0,704 0,352 0,175 1,310 0,629 0,315 
MB 0,950 2,629 1,631 0,326 1,027 2,084 1,577 0,261 
SIZE 7,774 18,132 12,756 1,867 8,637 16,490 12,913 1,970 
N 429 51 
Note: INVAT (investment divided by fixed assets) as the dependent variable, CFAT (cash flow divided by fixed assets) and DAR 
(total debt divided by total assets) as independent variable, MB (equity market value divided by book value of equity) and SIZE 
(Ln total assets) as control variable 
 
The results of testing hypothesis can be seen in Table 4 
below. 
 
Table 4: The result of testing hypothesis 
Variable 
Total Sample Low Investment High Investment 
coefficients t value coefficients t value coefficients t value 
CF 0,005 2,094** 0,005 2,400*** 0,009 3,897*** 
DAR 0,10 2,511*** 0,006 1,689** 0,008 1,809** 
D -0,018 -1,702** -0,004 -0,422 0,006 0,535 
CFAT*D 0,007 2,101** 0,004 2,043** -0,003 0,464 
DAR*D 0,010 1,138 0,007 -0,361 -0,007 -2,055** 
MB -0,001 -0,338 -0,007 -2,039** 0,001 0,187 
SIZE 0,001 0,962 0,001 0,392 -0,001 -0,945 
Constanta 0,144 0,157 0,214 
Note: ** Significant at level 5% (1,645) *** Significant at level 1% (2,326) CFAT (cash flow divided by fixed assets) is the proxy of 
liquidity and DAR (total debt divided by total assets) is the proxy of debt policy is an independent variable, D (dummy variable, 
1 for financially constrained firm, 0 for non-financially constrained firm), CFAT*D (interaction between CFAT and firm dummy 
financially constrained) and DAR*D (interaction between DAR and dummy of non-financially constrained firm) are moderating 
variables, MB (equity market value divided by book value of equity) and SIZE (Ln total assets) are control variables 
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Based on the result of testing hypothesis in Table 4, the 
total samples show that liquidity and debt have a 
significant positive effect on investment decision. In 
addition Table 4 above also shows that the liquidity 
moderation variable with financial constrains is the 
interaction between CFAT and dummy (CFAT*D) has a 
significant positive effect on the investment decision or it 
can be interpreted that liquidity is more sensitive to 
investment decision on FC firm than NFC firm. However, 
the reverse result shows that the moderation variable of 
debt policy with financial constrains that is DAR 
interaction with dummy (DAR*D) has an insignificant 
positive effect on investment decision, in other words that 
debt is not sensitive to investment decision at NFC firm. 
When the sample is divided into two that is firm that have 
low investment and firm that have high investment, the 
results showed that liquidity and debt have a significant 
positive effect on investment decisions firm. However, 
different results occur when moderated by financial 
constraints. In low-investment firms, liquidity is more 
sensitive to investment decisions of FC firms than NFC 
firms, while debt is not sensitive to investment decisions of 
NFC firm. In contrast to high-investment firm, debt is more 
sensitive to investment decisions of NFC than FC firms, 
while liquidity is not sensitive to investment decisions of 
FC firms. Table 4 also shows that liquidity positively 
affects to investment decisions both in the total sample 
firm and in the firm with low and high investment. This 
influence shows that with high liquidity, firms have the 
opportunity to invest more in capital expenditure, such as 
investment in fixed assets such as land or property, 
buildings, and equipment. However, with high firm 
liquidity it is sensitive to agency conflicts. According to the 
agency theory that managers prefer to use internal capital 
to finance investments because internal capital can reduce 
the involvement of oversight from shareholders or external 
parties to investment decisions made by managers. 
Managers tend to choose projects that outsiders find 
difficult to monitor, thereby allowing managers to make 
decisions that benefit them. Managers also prefer to keep 
free cash flows instead of distributing them to 
shareholders. The higher the free cash flows the greater 
the freedom of managers in controlling the firm's 
resources (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In addition, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) assert that with the asymmetry 
information, internal financing sources are cheaper than 
external financing such as debt, so the firm tend to choose 
internal financing rather than external financing. The 
results of this study are in accordance with research of 
Almeida and Campello (2007), Carpenter and Guariglia 
(2008), Chen et al. (2013), Bayraktar (2014), Ameer (2014), 
Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and 
Yang (2016), Quader (2016), George et al. (2011), Kim 
(2014), Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012), 
and Cull et al. (2014). The results of the research in Table 4 
above also shows that the debt has a significant positive 
effect on investment decisions both on the total sample 
firm and in the firm with low and high investment. As 
explained in agency theory, one of the mechanisms that 
can be used to increase the value of a firm is by increasing 
the proportion of debt as one of the bonding mechanisms 
to limit the manager's opportunistic behavior. Adding debt 
can reduce agency costs that can increase firm value 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From these statements can 
also be interpreted that the debt can be used by firms to 
invest in order to increase the value of the firm. The 
finding of this study show that the sources of debt funds 
are used by firm to make investments have been right on 
target. So it can be said that with the source of financing 
from the debt, the firm can make investments as expected, 
which can increase the value of the firm. The results of 
this study are in accordance with research of Ameer 
(2014), Guariglia and Yang (2016). The results of this study 
also indicate that there is interdependency between 
investment decision and financing decision. This means 
that when the firm has a goal to increase its value, then 
one that must be done is to make investments, and to 
make investments then the firm needs financing sources, 
in this case is the source of financing from the internal 
cash form (proxy of liquidity) and external financing that is 
debt. The results of this study differ from statement of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) which states that in perfect 
market conditions there is no relationship between 
investment decisions and financing decisions. The 
influence of liquidity and debt on investment decisions 
differs when moderated by FC and NFC firm, both 
investment stirrings in the total sample of the firm as well 
as investment decisions in firm with low or high 
investment. This is indicated by the result that liquidity 
has more influence on investment decision on FC firm than 
NFC firm. According to Fazzari et al. (1988) is attributed to 
information asymmetry on external financing, so that 
external financing such as debt is more expensive than 
internal financing which results in less FC firm having 
access to external financing sources. In addition the FC 
firm is relatively smaller, indicating financial limitations so 
it will be difficult for firm to take advantageous investment 
opportunity for investment. In other words, FC firm have 
low firm value. Thus, FC firms tend to be more sensitive to 
liquidity in investing in total sample of the firm and firm 
with low investment. The results of this study are in 
accordance with research of Chen et al. (2013), Bayraktar 
(2014), Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa 
(2015), Guariglia and Yang (2016), Quader (2016), George et 
al. (2011), and Kim (2014). In the sample of the firm as a 
whole found the result that the debt is not sensitive to the 
investment decision on the NFC firm. In contrast to the 
firm with low investment, debt is more sensitive to 
investment decisions in NFC firms than FC firms. The 
results of this study in accordance with research Lang, 
Ofek, and Stulz (1996) and Ogawa (2015). The firms with 
good prospects will address the need for funds by 
borrowing to invest. Refer to Guariglia and Yang (2016) the 
firm that FC is less able to invest more when there is a 
good opportunity by using internal cash or external funds. 
Firm investments are not only related to cash operations 
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but also related to external sources such as debt. The 
firms with high debt typically allocate their debts for 
investment, if the higher the debt the more assets the firm 
has. In other words, the firm with no financial constraints 
(NFC) will easily access the debt to invest. This means that 
NFC firms are more sensitive to debt in investing. 
Conclusion 
From the results of testing hypothesis, the 
conclusions of this study are: first, liquidity and debt have 
a positive effect on investment decisions. This influence 
shows that with high liquidity and debt, the firm has the 
opportunity to invest more in capital expenditure that is 
investment in fixed assets such as land or property, 
buildings, and equipment. So the firm will be able to alert 
the value of the firm. This indicates the existence of 
interdependency between financing decisions in this case 
liquidity and debt with investment decisions on the firm in 
Indonesia, especially the firm on the samples. Second, 
liquidity is more influential on investment decision on FC 
firm than NFC firm or in other words liquidity is more 
sensitive to investment decision on FC firm than NFC on 
total sample of firm and on the firm with low investment. 
This is due to the asymmetry of information on external 
financing, so that external financing such as debt is more 
expensive than internal financing which results in less FC 
firm having access to external financing sources. This 
shows that investment decision of FC firm is more 
sensitive to liquidity. Third, debt sensitivity to investment 
decisions is different in NFC firm. In the total sample of the 
firm, the debt does not significantly affect the investment 
decision on the NFC firm. However, in the sample of firm 
with high investment value, debt has more influence on 
investment decision on NFC firm than FC firm. In other 
words, debt is more sensitive to investment decisions on 
NFC firms than FC firms. This is because NFC firms tend 
to have easier access to external sources of funds, in this 
case debt, so as to easily adjust financing sources for 
investments that show greater financial flexibility. This 
means that NFC firms in investing are more sensitive to 
debt. 
Limitation 
The limitations in this study include: firstly, the 
sample only on the sharia firms listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange with a research period of only five years, 
for further research can increase the sample by comparing 
sharia firms in some countries and longer periods, 
secondly, the numbers of sample are too limited because 
there is any outlier data that have value of cash flow, 
market to book, debt to assets, and investment is negative, 
thirdly, this study uses only two independent variables of 
liquidity and debt, future research may need to add 
another relevant independent variable such as size or 
growth, and finally, samples is pooling so that one firm 
that entered the category of FC firm this year could be 
included in the category of NFC firm in the next year. 
Robustness test should be made, by holding-out sample. 
The only sample tested that is five years or three years in 
a row is in the same category. 
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